Being a Chinese Official: Not All It's Cracked Up to Be - Lily Kuo - The Atlantic

Being a Communist Party cadre has its advantages. But there are risks, too.

LILY KUOAPR 26 2013, 2:37 PM ET

Jason Lee/Reuters

Life as a Chinese government official isn't what it used to be. Lavish, liquor-heavy banquets have been outlawed. It will soon be harder to get those handy military license plates, useful for avoiding hassle from traffic police. And these days, with China's army of voracious and ever-watchful bloggers, every inappropriate smile, public temper tantrum, or luxury watch collection soon gets seen by the entire country.


The plight of the Chinese official isn't an issue many rally behind. The thousands of men and women who help run the country in posts ranging from head of an industrial park to a minister, are vilified by the public for their wealthelite connections , and privileged treatment. Officials are more often than not seen as part of China's problems with government corruption and negligence.

And yet, it's not easy being red and feeding from the iron rice bowl. Chinese officials, like political dissidents or regular citizens, also suffer under a party that is accountable chiefly to itself and a government that arbitrarily enforces laws.

In the last two weeks, two Chinese officials have mysteriously died after being detained by authorities under the party's internal discipline system, shuanggui. The family of Jia Jiuxiang, vice president of a court in Henan province, said Jia turned up badly bruised at a local hospital after being detained for 11 days. Hedied on the morning of April 25.

A week ago, a Chinese official by the name of Yu Qiyi died after arriving in a local hospital in Zhejiang province beaten, with blood coming out of his nose and ears . Chinese state media said Yu had "suffered an accident" while being questioned by party discipline officials. In both cases, reports said the officials were being investigated for corruption, but no more details were given.

Jia and Yu are just two examples of many more officials subject to shuanggui, which translates roughly as "double regulation,a way of keeping cadres in check that is essentially a separate, opaque, judicial system just for party and government officials. This table from Dui Hua Human Rights Journal summarizes some other well-known cases:

What little is known about the process comes from select stories reported in Chinese media. An official is detained, usually without notice. In the case of Jia, he was picked up by authorities on his way home from a trip and managed to make one hurried phone call to his ex-wife, the last time they spoke before his death. Other officials' deaths have been attributed to vague and strange causes like drinking boiled water or playing hide and seek.

"The idea that the party essentially runs its own separate justice system, detached from the formal justice system, is a real concern," Sophie Richardson, China director for Human Rights Watch, tells Quartz. Detainment can last fordays or months -- in some cases, officials have disappeared for years. Isolation, torture, and sleep deprivation are common interrogation techniques, experts say.

Officials in question usually lose their posts, careers never to be rehabilitated, and see all their property seized. High-profile cases are sometimes made into criminal cases to go through the regular justice system, but the verdict has already been determined. Suicide is common before that point.

Now, more officials may be at risk under an anti-corruption campaign launched by China's new leader Xi Jinping. The party appointed one of its most well-respected officials, Wang Qishan, as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which implements the shuanggui -- a sign some have taken to mean a serious crackdown is underway. Authorities say they have investigated over 660,000 officials over the past five years.

Officials at levels higher than Yu and Jia, who can often be protected by other elites, don't appear to be immune and in some ways they are more vulnerable. Former railway minister, in charge when a high speed train crash killed dozens in 2011, was charged for corruption and abuse of power earlier in April. Bo Xilai, fallen former powerful party secretary of Chongqing, hasn't been seen in public since last year and has still not been tried in court.

"It means that criticism is getting greater. They were under no obligation to report these deaths. This was a choice that someone made. The easiest thing to do would have been to cover up the whole thing,"

Yet, the fact that the recent deaths of Yu and Jia were reported in national Chinese media may be a sign of a rising tide of opposition. "It means that criticism is getting greater. They were under no obligation to report these deaths. This was a choice that someone made. The easiest thing to do would have been to cover up the whole thing," Flora Sapio, an expert in Chinese law at Chinese University Hong Kong, tells Quartz.

Defenders of shuanggui, which dates back to the early days of the People's Republic, say it's akin to an internal audit of a company. Over the past decade, leaders have spoken more openly about the system and made efforts to institutionalize it with guidelines. In 2009, the head of the CCDI said in a press conference thatshuanggui operates under stringent regulations that ban corporal punishment and mandate respect for "the dignity" of those investigated.

Still, shuanggui is shrouded in mystery. There are no available data for how many officials are disciplined through it or to what extent regulations are followed, according to Sapio. "Officially, it can be used only on officials who serve at the county level and above, and only in what [the party] calls 'important and complicated' cases of corruption or official crime. The problem is, what is 'important and complicated'?" she says.

The system is likely to stay as it is. Officials in opposition would have to prove an alternative discipline system is better or that shuanggui is not effective, Sapio says. Moreover, it is a way to discipline officials out of the public eye and keep scandal to a minimum. Drawing media attention to the recent grisly deaths may have simply been a call for the rights of officials to be respected, not to disband shuanggui. Given how many Chinese, ready pounce on chances to expose corrupt officials, see rough treatment of corrupt officials as rightful retribution, it's hard to see China changing course soon. 

China's Internet is a Giant Shopping Mall [Infographic] | Alizila: News about E-commerce, Alibaba Group, China’s Internet, Alibaba.com and Taobao

China's Internet is a Giant Shopping Mall [Infographic] | Alizila: News about E-commerce, Alibaba Group, China’s Internet, Alibaba.com and Taobao

Clipped from: http://www.alizila.com/chinas-internet-giant-shopping-mall-infographic?utm_source=Sinocism+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9dfa9fdd2d-Sinocism02_28_13&utm_medium=email

China's Internet is a Giant Shopping Mall [Infographic]

By
Jim Erickson
| Feb 27, 2013 | 04:07 PM

It's well known that the spending power of China's rising middle class is changing the global retail landscape. Less understood is the enthusiasm Chinese consumers have for shopping on the Internet. After increasing by 55% last year to $194 billion, China's total online retail spending this year could blow by that of the U.S., making the mainland the world's largest online shopping market, some researchers are predicting. Check out this infographic to find out how much the average Chinese consumer spends via the Internet, what they buy, and how fast their e-consumption is growing.

To view a larger version of the infographic, click here. To see how China compares with the U.K. and Europe, click here.


The End of the Chinese Dream

From Evernote:

The End of the Chinese Dream - By Christina Larson | Foreign Policy

Clipped from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/end_of_the_chinese_dream?wp_login_redirect=0



The End of the Chinese Dream

As China's economy continues to trend downward, Beijing's elites are sparking a new, palpable frustration in the general population.

BY CHRISTINA LARSON | DECEMBER 21, 2011

BEIJING – In June, a Chinese friend of mine who grew up in the northern industrial city of Shenyang and recently graduated from university moved to Beijing to follow his dream -- working for a media company. He has a full-time job, but the entry-level pay isn't great and it's tough to make ends meet. When we had lunch recently, he brought up his housing situation, which he described as "not ideal." He was living in a three-bedroom apartment split by seven people, near the Fourth Ring Road -- the outer orbit of the city. Five of his roommates were young women who went to work each night at 11 p.m. and returned around 4 a.m. "They say they are working the overnight shift at Tesco," the British retailer, but he was dubious. One night he saw them entering a KTV Club wearing lots of makeup and "skirts much shorter than my boxers" and, tellingly, proceeding through the employee entrance. "So they are prostitutes," he concluded. "I feel a little uncomfortable."

But when he tallied his monthly expenses and considered his lack of special connections, or guanxi, in the city, either to help boost his paycheck or to find more comfortable but not more expensive housing, he figured he'd stick out the grim living situation. "I have come here to be a journalist -- it is my goal, and I do not want to go back now. But it seems like it's harder than it used to be."

When I asked how his colleagues and former classmates were getting along, he thought about it for a moment and then replied that some were basically in the same lot as him, "but many of my friends have parents in Beijing, and they can save money to live with them. If your family is already established here, it helps a lot." After a moment, he added: "And some of them have rich parents who have already bought them their own apartments -- and cars."

Despite China's astonishing economic growth, it has gotten harder for people like my friend to get by in the big city. His is not a particularly lucrative profession. Like many in Beijing, he cannot count on his annual pay to keep pace with China's official rates of inflation -- which many economists suspect are lowballed anyway. (The consumer-price-index inflation rate is considered so sensitive that the State Council approves it before it is released publicly.) Even so, every month this year consumer-price-index inflation has exceeded the official average monthly target of 4 percent. Last month state media hailed it as good news that it was, officially, just 4.2 percent.

Anyone in Beijing can point to examples of friends who see rents hiked 10 percent or more in one year. The prices at restaurants keep going up, even as portions are getting noticeably smaller. Throw in the loss of intangibles that money can't buy -- like air quality and food safety -- and you begin to understand the grumbling among some of Beijing's non-wealthy folks that their standard of living seems to be diminishing, even as the national GDP surges ahead at a heady 9 percent.

Could it possibly be true that a swath of people in China's big cities is downwardly mobile, if one compared wages with living expenses? I asked Patrick Chovanec, an associate professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing. Alas, he told me, it's difficult to find much clarification in China's famously fudgeable official statistics. (For instance, the official unemployment rate only includes individuals with urban hukous, or permanent residency permits -- which excludes the most economically vulnerable.) Still, he noted: "If you perceive that you're losing buying power -- or have rising but unmet expectations -- that's when people get upset.… And this country, for a country growing at over 9 percent, is in a foul mood."

Indeed, there is a palpable sense of frustration in Beijing, especially compared with the last time I lived here in 2008. You can see it on the dour faces on the metro, hear it in raspy voices at dinner conversations, and especially sense it in the new gruffness of taxi drivers, who no longer think ferrying people around town for 10 yuan, about $1.60, is such a good deal for them (their base fare hasn't been raised). Still, it's hard to rage against abstractions. It's a lot easier to fume at obnoxious people.

No wonder, then, that in 2011 the Chinese media and Sina Weibo (China's version of Twitter) buzzed nearly every month with salacious reports of China's Paris Hilton-types -- the sons and daughters of the wealthy and political elite, dangling opulent accessories and impoverished judgment -- behaving badly in BMWs and Audis and typically expecting to get away with it, to boot.The year began with the trial of Li Qiming, a university student in Hebei province who in October 2010 was drunk-driving and slammed into two other college students out skating, killing one of them. When he saw what had happened, he tried to speed away, but the campus guard stopped his vehicle. When questioned, the first thing he is widely reported to have blurted out was, "My father is Li Gang." Li Gang is the district's deputy police chief.

Then there was 15-year-old Li Tianyi, the son of a high-ranking army official, who had no license when he got behind the wheel of a BMW in September. While carousing the streets of Beijing, he grew frustrated when another car was blocking his path. He reportedly got out of the car and assaulted the other driver while either he or a friend shouted, "Who will dare call the police?" Behind his car's windshield was a temporary driving pass for the Great Hall of the People, China's parliament building.

And earlier this month, a student at Beijing Film Academy got into a fight over where he could park his Audi, the telltale car of choice of Chinese officials. After a brawl in the parking lot, a cleaner, a 43-year-old migrant worker from nearby Hebei province, was taken to a hospital, where he died.

Perhaps the closest female equivalent was the lightning-rod saga of Guo "Meimei," a petite 20-year-old with a heart-shaped face and big brown eyes who took to posting photos of herself driving her "little horse" (a white Maserati) and her "little bull" (an orange Lamborghini) on her Weibo microblog. On her account, she claimed to be a general manager at the Red Cross of China, one of the country's largest and most politically connected charities. Her luxury goods, not to mention horrible judgment, were widely taken by readers as signs of corruption at the charity. (In the months following the scandal, which reached its zenith in June, donations to the charity dropped off precipitously). Later, it came out that she held no such position and was rumored instead to be either a mistress or relative of someone at the Red Cross.

The anger in China at such dilettantes misbehaving runs deeper than, say, America's love-hate relationship with Lindsay Lohan. As Michael Anti, a popular Chinese blogger and political commentator, told me, "The rich are becoming a dynasty." Now people in China recognize that "you get your position not by degree or hard work, but by your daddy." Anti added that though corruption and guanxi are hardly new concepts in China, there was previously a greater belief in social mobility through merit. "Before, university was a channel to help you to ruling class. Now the ruling class just promote themselves."

There is a dark sense that something has changed. "It's not simply income equality that bothers people -- that's a misconception," Chovanec told me. "When Jack Ma makes a billion dollars for starting a successful company, that's OK.… It's inequality of privilege. It's how people make their money. There's now a whole class of people getting wealthy because of who they are, not what they do -- and they follow a different set of rules."

In today's China, the abilities to buy and sell real estate and to win government contracts are among the greatest drivers of wealth, and it's those who are already wealthy and well-connected who have access to these opportunities. If their children are lazy or dull, they can use their stature to create opportunities and positions for them, cutting short the trajectories of more able aspirants. Social status is becoming further entrenched because, as Chovanec notes, "Government is so pervasive in China's economy.… Government has great power in determining winners and losers, so who you are and who you know does more than anything else to determine success." And those at the top increasingly act above the law. "Privilege begets money, and money begets privilege."

This, of course, runs counter to the optimistic, popular fairy tale of China over the past 30 years, duly promoted by the ruling Communist Party, that a rising tide and roaring economy inevitably lifts all boats; that the future will be better, materially, than the past; that hard work will get you ahead; and that education is the great leveler. Call it the Chinese dream.

"Well, that used to be true, pretty much -- but not now," reflects Qiao Mu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. "Take myself. I was born in 1970 into a poor family in west China. There wasn't yet a large class of rich people in China, so the opportunities were more open. At that time, I could depend on my hard work and study to advance. I could change my position in society." But today, he says, sighing deeply, "It's much more difficult for these young guys, my students. You have to rely on your background, and those who already have connections and wealth help themselves and their children.… The condition is getting worse, not better."

Or, as my friend, the struggling reporter, put it: "People no longer believe you can win by working hard and honestly in China." 

What Chinese Consumers Want - WSJ.com

What Chinese Consumers Want - WSJ.com

Clipped from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303360504577408493723814210.html

By TOM DOCTOROFF

Apple has taken China by storm. A Starbucks can be found on practically every major street corner in coastal cities and beyond. From Nike to Buick to Siemens, Chinese consumers actively prefer Western brands over their domestic competitors. The rise of microbloggers, the popularity of rock bands with names like Hutong Fist and Catcher in the Rye, and even the newfound popularity of Christmas all seem to point toward a growing Westernization.

As Western retailers bet on China to drive profits, some of the biggest mistakes are made because brands don't understand the Chinese consumer. The WSJ's Deborah Kan speaks to Tom Doctoroff, author of the book "What Chinese Want: Culture, Communism & The Modern Chinese Consumer."

But don't be deceived by appearances. Consumers in China aren't becoming "Western." They are increasingly modern and international, but they remain distinctly Chinese. If I've learned anything from my 20 years working as an advertising executive in China, it is that successful Western brands craft their message here to be "global," not "foreign"—so that they can become vessels of Chinese culture.

Understanding China's consumer culture is a good starting point for understanding the nation itself, as it races toward superpower status. Though the country's economy and society are evolving rapidly, the underlying cultural blueprint has remained more or less constant for thousands of years. China is a Confucian society, a quixotic combination of top-down patriarchy and bottom-up social mobility. Citizens are driven by an ever-present conflict between standing out and fitting in, between ambition and regimentation. In Chinese society, individuals have no identity apart from obligations to, and acknowledgment by, others. The clan and nation are the eternal pillars of identity. Western individualism—the idea of defining oneself independent of society—doesn't exist.

Sean McCabe

Even beer must do something— like reinforce trust or promote financial gain. In the West, letting the good times roll is enough.

Various youth subtribes intermittently bubble to the surface—see the recent rise of "vegetable males" (Chinese metrosexuals) and "Taobao maniacs" (aficionados of the auction website Taobao). But self-expression is generally frowned upon, and societal acknowledgment is still tantamount to success. Liberal arts majors are considered inferior to graduates with engineering or accounting degrees. Few dare to see a psychologist for fear of losing "face"—the respect or deference of others—or being branded sick. Failure to have a child is a grave disappointment.

The speed with which China's citizens have embraced all things digital is one sign that things are in motion in the country. But e-commerce, which has changed the balance of power between retailers and consumers, didn't take off until the Chinese need for reassurance was satisfied. Even when transactions are arranged online, most purchases are completed in person, with shoppers examining the product and handing over their cash offline.

Photos: Chinese Consumer Culture

Getty Images

Brands like Starbucks, Prada and Porsche have made deep in roads Consumers in China aren't becoming "Western." They are increasingly modern and international, but they remain distinctly Chinese.

Even digital self-expression needs to be safe, cloaked in anonymity. Social networking sites such as Sina Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), Renren and Kaixing Wang (Chinese versions of Facebook) have exploded. But users hide behind avatars and pseudonyms. A survey conducted by the advertising firm JWT, where I work, and IAC, the Internet holding company, found that less than a third of young Americans agreed with the statement "I feel free to do and say things [online] I wouldn't do or say offline," and 41% disagreed. Among Chinese respondents, 73% agreed, and just 9% disagreed.

Chinese at all socioeconomic levels try to "win"—that is, climb the ladder of success—while working within the system, not against it. In Chinese consumer culture, there is a constant tension between self-protection and displaying status. This struggle explains the existence of two seemingly conflicting lines of development. On the one hand, we see stratospheric savings rates, extreme price sensitivity and aversion to credit-card interest payments. On the other, there is the Chinese fixation with luxury goods and a willingness to pay as much as 120% of one's yearly income for a car.

Every day, the Chinese confront shredded social safety nets, a lack of institutions that protect individual wealth, contaminated food products and myriad other risks to home and health. The instinct of consumers to project status through material display is counterbalanced by conservative buying behavior. Protective benefits are the primary consideration for consumers. Even high-end paints must establish their lack of toxicity before touting the virtues of colorful self-expression. Safety is a big concern for all car buyers, at either end of the price spectrum.

To win a following among Chinese buyers, brands have to follow three rules. First and most important, products that are consumed in public, directly or indirectly, command huge price premiums relative to goods used in private. The leading mobile phone brands are international. The leading household appliance brands, by contrast, are cheaply priced domestic makers such as TCL, Changhong and Little Swan. According to a study by the U.K.-based retailer B&Q, the average middle-class Chinese spends only $15,000 to fit out a completely bare 1,000-square-foot apartment.

Luxury items are desired more as status investments than for their inherent beauty or craftsmanship. The Chinese are now the world's most avid luxury shoppers, at least if trips abroad to cities like Hong Kong and Paris are taken into account. According to Global Refund, a company specializing in tax-free shopping for tourists, the Chinese account for 15% of all luxury items purchased in France but less than 2% of its visitors.

Public display is also a critical consideration in how global brands are repositioning themselves to attract Chinese consumers. Despite China's tea culture, Starbucks successfully established itself as a public venue in which professional tribes gather to proclaim their affiliation with the new-generation elite. Both Pizza Hut and Häagen Dazs have built mega-franchises in China rooted in out-of-home consumption. (The $5 carton of vanilla to be eaten at home is a tough sell in China.)

The second rule is that the benefits of a product should be external, not internal. Even for luxury goods, celebrating individualism—with familiar Western notions like "what I want" and "how I feel"—doesn't work in China. Automobiles need to make a statement about a man on his way up. BMW, for example, has successfully fused its global slogan of the "ultimate driving machine" with a Chinese-style declaration of ambition.

Sometimes the difference between internal versus external payoffs can be quite subtle. Spas and resorts do better when they promise not only relaxation but also recharged batteries. Infant formulas must promote intelligence, not happiness. Kids aren't taken to Pizza Hut so that they can enjoy pizza; they are rewarded with academic "triumph feasts." Beauty products must help a woman "move forward." Even beer must do something. In Western countries, letting the good times roll is enough; in China, pilsner must bring people together, reinforce trust and promote mutual financial gain.

Emotional payoffs must be practical, even in matters of the heart. Valentine's Day is almost as dear to the Chinese as the Lunar New Year, but they view it primarily as an opportunity for men to demonstrate their worthiness and commitment. In the U.S., De Beers's slogan, "A Diamond is Forever," glorifies eternal romance. In China, the same tagline connotes obligation, a familial covenant—rock solid, like the stone itself.

The last rule for positioning a brand in China is that products must address the need to navigate the crosscurrents of ambition and regimentation, of standing out while fitting in. Men want to succeed without violating the rules of the game, which is why wealthier individuals prefer Audis or BMWs over flashy Maseratis.

Luxury buyers want to demonstrate mastery of the system while remaining understated, hence the appeal of Mont Blanc's six-point logo or Bottega Veneta's signature cross weave—both conspicuously discreet. Young consumers want both stylishness and acceptance, so they opt for more conventionally hip fashion brands like Converse and Uniqlo.

Chinese parents are drawn to brands promising "stealthy learning" for their children: intellectual development masked as fun. Disney will succeed more as an educational franchise—its English learning centers are going gangbusters—than as a theme park. McDonald's restaurants, temples of childhood delight in the West, have morphed into scholastic playgrounds in China: Happy Meals include collectible Snoopy figurines wearing costumes from around the world, while the McDonald's website, hosted by Professor Ronald, offers Happy Courses for multiplication. Skippy peanut butter combines "delicious peanut taste" and "intelligent sandwich preparation."

Even China's love affair with Christmas—with big holiday sales and ubiquitous seasonal music, even in Communist Party buildings—advances a distinctly Chinese agenda. Santa is a symbol of progress; he represents the country's growing comfort with a new global order, one into which it is determined to assimilate, without sacrificing the national interest. The holiday has become a way to project status in a culture in which individual identity is inextricably linked to external validation.

The American dream—wealth that culminates in freedom—is intoxicating for the Chinese. But whereas Americans dream of "independence," Chinese crave "control" of their own destiny and command over the vagaries of daily life. Material similarities between Chinese and Americans mask fundamentally different emotional impulses. If Western brands can learn to meet China's worldview on its own terms, perhaps the West as a whole can too.

—Mr. Doctoroff is the author of "What Chinese Want: Culture, Communism and China's Modern Consumer" and is the North Asia director and Greater China CEO for J. Walter Thompson, whose clients include Starbucks, De Beers and Renren.

Chinese Hackers Infiltrate New York Times Computers - NYTimes.com

Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months

SAN FRANCISCO — For the last four months, Chinese hackers have persistently attacked The New York Times, infiltrating its computer systems and getting passwords for its reporters and other employees.

After surreptitiously tracking the intruders to study their movements and help erect better defenses to block them, The Times and computer security experts have expelled the attackers and kept them from breaking back in.

The timing of the attacks coincided with the reporting for a Times investigation, published online on Oct. 25, that found that the relatives of Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, had accumulated a fortune worth several billion dollars through business dealings.

Security experts hired by The Times to detect and block the computer attacks gathered digital evidence that Chinese hackers, using methods that some consultants have associated with the Chinese military in the past, breached The Times’s network. They broke into the e-mail accounts of its Shanghai bureau chief, David Barboza, who wrote the reports on Mr. Wen’s relatives, and Jim Yardley, The Times’s South Asia bureau chief in India, who previously worked as bureau chief in Beijing.

“Computer security experts found no evidence that sensitive e-mails or files from the reporting of our articles about the Wen family were accessed, downloaded or copied,” said Jill Abramson, executive editor of The Times.

The hackers tried to cloak the source of the attacks on The Times by first penetrating computers at United States universities and routing the attacks through them, said computer security experts at Mandiant, the company hired by The Times. This matches the subterfuge used in many other attacks that Mandiant has tracked to China.

The attackers first installed malware — malicious software — that enabled them to gain entry to any computer on The Times’s network. The malware was identified by computer security experts as a specific strain associated with computer attacks originating in China. More evidence of the source, experts said, is that the attacks started from the same university computers used by the Chinese military to attack United States military contractors in the past.

Security experts found evidence that the hackers stole the corporate passwords for every Times employee and used those to gain access to the personal computers of 53 employees, most of them outside The Times’s newsroom. Experts found no evidence that the intruders used the passwords to seek information that was not related to the reporting on the Wen family.

No customer data was stolen from The Times, security experts said.

Asked about evidence that indicated the hacking originated in China, and possibly with the military, China’s Ministry of National Defense said, “Chinese laws prohibit any action including hacking that damages Internet security.” It added that “to accuse the Chinese military of launching cyberattacks without solid proof is unprofessional and baseless.”

The attacks appear to be part of a broader computer espionage campaign against American news media companies that have reported on Chinese leaders and corporations.

Last year, Bloomberg News was targeted by Chinese hackers, and some employees’ computers were infected, according to a person with knowledge of the company’s internal investigation, after Bloomberg published an article on June 29 about the wealth accumulated by relatives of Xi Jinping, China’s vice president at the time. Mr. Xi became general secretary of the Communist Party in November and is expected to become president in March. Ty Trippet, a spokesman for Bloomberg, confirmed that hackers had made attempts but said that “no computer systems or computers were compromised.”

Signs of a Campaign

The mounting number of attacks that have been traced back to China suggest that hackers there are behind a far-reaching spying campaign aimed at an expanding set of targets including corporations, government agencies, activist groups and media organizations inside the United States. The intelligence-gathering campaign, foreign policy experts and computer security researchers say, is as much about trying to control China’s public image, domestically and abroad, as it is about stealing trade secrets.

Security experts said that beginning in 2008, Chinese hackers began targeting Western journalists as part of an effort to identify and intimidate their sources and contacts, and to anticipate stories that might damage the reputations of Chinese leaders.

In a December intelligence report for clients, Mandiant said that over the course of several investigations it found evidence that Chinese hackers had stolen e-mails, contacts and files from more than 30 journalists and executives at Western news organizations, and had maintained a “short list” of journalists whose accounts they repeatedly attack.

While computer security experts say China is most active and persistent, it is not alone in using computer attacks for a variety of national purposes, including corporate espionage. The United States, Israel, Russia and Iran, among others, are suspected of developing and deploying cyberweapons.

The United States and Israel have never publicly acknowledged it, but evidence indicates they released a sophisticated computer worm starting around 2008 that attacked and later caused damage at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment plant. Iran is believed to have responded with computer attacks on targets in the United States, including American banks and foreign oil companies.

Russia is suspected of having used computer attacks during its war with Georgia in 2008.

The following account of the attack on The Times — which is based on interviews with Times executives, reporters and security experts — provides a glimpse into one such spy campaign.

After The Times learned of warnings from Chinese government officials that its investigation of the wealth of Mr. Wen’s relatives would “have consequences,” executives on Oct. 24 asked AT&T, which monitors The Times’s computer network, to watch for unusual activity.

On Oct. 25, the day the article was published online, AT&T informed The Times that it had noticed behavior that was consistent with other attacks believed to have been perpetrated by the Chinese military.

The Times notified and voluntarily briefed the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the attacks and then — not initially recognizing the extent of the infiltration of its computers — worked with AT&T to track the attackers even as it tried to eliminate them from its systems.

But on Nov. 7, when it became clear that attackers were still inside its systems despite efforts to expel them, The Times hired Mandiant, which specializes in responding to security breaches. Since learning of the attacks, The Times — first with AT&T and then with Mandiant — has monitored attackers as they have moved around its systems.

Hacker teams regularly began work, for the most part, at 8 a.m. Beijing time. Usually they continued for a standard work day, but sometimes the hacking persisted until midnight. Occasionally, the attacks stopped for two-week periods, Mandiant said, though the reason was not clear.

Investigators still do not know how hackers initially broke into The Times’s systems. They suspect the hackers used a so-called spear-phishing attack, in which they send e-mails to employees that contain malicious links or attachments. All it takes is one click on the e-mail by an employee for hackers to install “remote access tools” — or RATs. Those tools can siphon off oceans of data — passwords, keystrokes, screen images, documents and, in some cases, recordings from computers’ microphones and Web cameras — and send the information back to the attackers’ Web servers.

Michael Higgins, chief security officer at The Times, said: “Attackers no longer go after our firewall. They go after individuals. They send a malicious piece of code to your e-mail account and you’re opening it and letting them in.”

Lying in Wait

Once hackers get in, it can be hard to get them out. In the case of a 2011 breach at the United States Chamber of Commerce, for instance, the trade group worked closely with the F.B.I. to seal its systems, according to chamber employees. But months later, the chamber discovered that Internet-connected devices — a thermostat in one of its corporate apartments and a printer in its offices — were still communicating with computers in China.

In part to prevent that from happening, The Times allowed hackers to spin a digital web for four months to identify every digital back door the hackers used. It then replaced every compromised computer and set up new defenses in hopes of keeping hackers out.

“Attackers target companies for a reason — even if you kick them out, they will try to get back in,” said Nick Bennett, the security consultant who has managed Mandiant’s investigation. “We wanted to make sure we had full grasp of the extent of their access so that the next time they try to come in, we can respond quickly.”

Based on a forensic analysis going back months, it appears the hackers broke into The Times computers on Sept. 13, when the reporting for the Wen articles was nearing completion. They set up at least three back doors into users’ machines that they used as a digital base camp. From there they snooped around The Times’s systems for at least two weeks before they identified the domain controller that contains user names and hashed, or scrambled, passwords for every Times employee.

While hashes make hackers’ break-ins more difficult, hashed passwords can easily be cracked using so-called rainbow tables — readily available databases of hash values for nearly every alphanumeric character combination, up to a certain length. Some hacker Web sites publish as many as 50 billion hash values.

Investigators found evidence that the attackers cracked the passwords and used them to gain access to a number of computers. They created custom software that allowed them to search for and grab Mr. Barboza’s and Mr. Yardley’s e-mails and documents from a Times e-mail server.

Over the course of three months, attackers installed 45 pieces of custom malware. The Times — which uses antivirus products made by Symantec — found only one instance in which Symantec identified an attacker’s software as malicious and quarantined it, according to Mandiant.

A Symantec spokesman said that, as a matter of policy, the company does not comment on its customers.

The attackers were particularly active in the period after the Oct. 25 publication of The Times article about Mr. Wen’s relatives, especially on the evening of the Nov. 6 presidential election. That raised concerns among Times senior editors who had been informed of the attacks that the hackers might try to shut down the newspaper’s electronic or print publishing system. But the attackers’ movements suggested that the primary target remained Mr. Barboza’s e-mail correspondence.

“They could have wreaked havoc on our systems,” said Marc Frons, the Times’s chief information officer. “But that was not what they were after.”

What they appeared to be looking for were the names of people who might have provided information to Mr. Barboza.

Mr. Barboza’s research on the stories, as reported previously in The Times, was based on public records, including thousands of corporate documents through China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Those documents — which are available to lawyers and consulting firms for a nominal fee — were used to trace the business interests of relatives of Mr. Wen.

A Tricky Search

Tracking the source of an attack to one group or country can be difficult because hackers usually try to cloak their identities and whereabouts.

To run their Times spying campaign, the attackers used a number of compromised computer systems registered to universities in North Carolina, Arizona, Wisconsin and New Mexico, as well as smaller companies and Internet service providers across the United States, according to Mandiant’s investigators.

The hackers also continually switched from one I.P. address to another; an I.P. address, for Internet protocol, is a unique number identifying each Internet-connected device from the billions around the globe, so that messages and other information sent by one device are correctly routed to the ones meant to get them.

Using university computers as proxies and switching I.P. addresses were simply efforts to hide the source of the attacks, which investigators say is China. The pattern that Mandiant’s experts detected closely matched the pattern of earlier attacks traced to China. After Google was attacked in 2010 and the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists were opened, for example, investigators were able to trace the source to two educational institutions in China, including one with ties to the Chinese military.

Security experts say that by routing attacks through servers in other countries and outsourcing attacks to skilled hackers, the Chinese military maintains plausible deniability.

“If you look at each attack in isolation, you can’t say, ‘This is the Chinese military,’ ” said Richard Bejtlich, Mandiant’s chief security officer.

But when the techniques and patterns of the hackers are similar, it is a sign that the hackers are the same or affiliated.

“When you see the same group steal data on Chinese dissidents and Tibetan activists, then attack an aerospace company, it starts to push you in the right direction,” he said.

Mandiant has been tracking about 20 groups that are spying on organizations inside the United States and around the globe. Its investigators said that based on the evidence — the malware used, the command and control centers compromised and the hackers’ techniques — The Times was attacked by a group of Chinese hackers that Mandiant refers to internally as “A.P.T. Number 12.”

A.P.T. stands for Advanced Persistent Threat, a term that computer security experts and government officials use to describe a targeted attack and that many say has become synonymous with attacks done by China. AT&T and the F.B.I. have been tracking the same group, which they have also traced to China, but they use their own internal designations.

Mandiant said the group had been “very active” and had broken into hundreds of other Western organizations, including several American military contractors.

To get rid of the hackers, The Times blocked the compromised outside computers, removed every back door into its network, changed every employee password and wrapped additional security around its systems.

For now, that appears to have worked, but investigators and Times executives say they anticipate more efforts by hackers.

“This is not the end of the story,” said Mr. Bejtlich of Mandiant. “Once they take a liking to a victim, they tend to come back. It’s not like a digital crime case where the intruders steal stuff and then they’re gone. This requires an internal vigilance model.”

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: January 31, 2013

An earlier version of this article misstated the timing of a cyberattack that caused damage at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment plant. Evidence suggests that the United States and Israel released a computer worm around 2008, not 2012.

Jeff Faubel 
Sent from my iPhone

Online and Off, Social Media Users Go to War for Freedom of Press in China | Tea Leaf Nation

Clipped from: http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/01/online-and-off-social-media-users-go-to-war-for-freedom-of-press-in-china/
http://tinyurl.com/b9qavk8

January 7, 2013 | by Rachel

Online and Off, Social Media Users Go to War for Freedom of Press in China

    When Mr. Tuo Zhen, the propaganda chief of Guangdong province, rewrote and replaced the New Year editorial of the Southern Weekend weekly newspaper without the consent of its editors, he probably did not think it would make much of a splash. Indeed, Mr. Tuo might have believed that it was a natural extension of his job, which involved issuing censorship directives to newspaper editors, approving story ideas and having the final say on whether an article is put to ink.

    He could not have been more wrong.

    In China, where journalists usually accept censorship of the print press as a fact of life, Mr. Tuo’s presumptuous move somehow touched a raw nerve. Through China’s social media, in particular its Twitter-like microblog platforms, the editors of Southern Weekend released statements about the incident. And almost overnight, “Southern Weekend” became the rallying cry of users longing for freedom of press in China.

    And these include some of Chinese social media’s most high profile users from all walks of life. Celebrities such as actress Yao Chen (with 31 million followers) and actor Chen Kui (with 27 million followers) tweeted explicit messages of support on Sina Weibo, a microblog platform. Yao quoted the 1970 Nobel lecture of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian author and dissident, along with a logo of Southern Weekend. Chen was more direct: “I am not that deep, and I don’t play word games; I support the friends at Southern Weekend.”

    Active censorship of this topic on social media, including the deletion of Weibo accounts of several outspoken commentators, have not dampened users’ determination to keep the cause alive.

    Ren Zhiqiang (@任志强), one of the most outspoken businessmen in China with almost 13 million followers, tweeted on Sina Weibo, “Freedom of press and freedom of speech are rights given to the society and the people by the constitution; they are also symbols of human rights and freedom. Yet they have become pipe dreams without the rule of law, being seriously distorted and restricted. If truth is not allowed to be spoken, would truth disappear?”

    Li Chengpeng and Han Han, China’s two most famous bloggers, both wrote articles in support of Southern Weekend. Li wrote, “We don’t need tall buildings, but we need a newspaper that speaks the truth. We don’t need the second highest GDP in the world, but we need a newspaper that speaks the truth. We don’t need a fleet of aircraft carriers, but we need a newspaper that speaks the truth.”

    Even the web editors of China’s biggest Internet portals, including Sina, Sohu and Netease, showed their support with a little subversive game. For example, when read vertically, the first characters of seemingly unrelated headlines on a Sina news page delivered the hidden message “Go Southern Weekend!”

    Online action has translated into real-life protest. On Monday, hundreds of supporters held rallies outside of Southern Weekend’s headquarter in Guangzhou, many bearing chrysanthemums, a flower believed to be able to endure harsh climates. Many were not afraid to show their faces while holding up signs and placards calling for freedom of press. Indeed, one girl held up two fingers in a victory sign as the police took photos of her, presumably as evidence for potential prosecution in the future:

    One woman looked fear in the eye, and said, “cheese.” (Via Weibo)

    User @吖小寒 reported from the front lines, “I have to say that the rally today was quite orderly. Some volunteers picked up trash at the scene. The police were quite patient too–they kept order without resorting to violence and did not take away anyone’s placards. Even when everyone started shouting slogans about constitutionalism and democracy, the police just watched on the sidelines. Thousands of cell phones broadcast information from the scene in real time. I think we can definitely have democracy if everyone behaves like this!”

    Lin Tianhong (@林天宏), a magazine editor, penned a Sina Weibo post that seemed to capture the sense that a tipping point may have been reached. He wrote,

    Over the years, we journalists have been censored and silenced.  We are used to it. We started to compromise and self-comfort. We became familiar with the explicit and not-so-explicit boundaries of our work, and we began to self-censor. We were like frogs being cooked in tepid water… We have gone too far, as if we have forgotten why we chose this profession to begin with. Why are we trying to protect our colleagues at Southern Weekend? For me there is only one reason, life is just a few decades long, how can you forget your innocence?

    Solzhenitsyn, Yao Chen, and Chinese Reform : The New Yorker

    p, td { line-height: 1.3; } p { padding-bottom: 1em; } a { color: #3697b3; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { color: #000; text-decoration: underline; } a:active { color: #000; text-decoration: underline; } From Evernote: Solzhenitsyn, Yao Chen, and Chinese Reform : The New Yorker
    As blowback from the censorship of the Southern Weekly New Year's editorial plays out, this piece by Evan Osnos neatly frames the key issues.

    KuaiYong: Chinese Startup Enables iOS App Piracy w/o a Jailbreak

    From Evernote:

    KuaiYong: Chinese Startup Enables iOS App Piracy w/o a Jailbreak

    Clipped from: http://www.techinasia.com/china-kuaiyong-apple-ios-app-piracy-no-jailbreak/
    I tell my Chinese friends app developers have to eat too, it's just a few kuai per app, but it's to no avail. Software piracy seems to be in the DNA. And now it's possible to pirate apps without jailbreaking your device and being stuck with some obsolete version of iOS.

    How Has Apple Not Killed This? Chinese Startup Enables iOS App Piracy Without a Jailbreak

    Jan 2, 2013 at 12:42 PM by Steven Millward, in Asia, Mobile, Startups, Web

    Discussion:     13

      With the recent closure of the iOS jailbreak app Installous, the mischievous hive-mind of the web has been looking for an alternative way of running pirated apps. And you won’t be too surprised to learn that China has the answer in the form of KuaiYong (literally meaning “use quickly”). It’s essentially a rogue app store in the form of a Windows PC app that allows pirated iPhone and iPad apps to be installed without even needing a jailbreak.

      This alarming development means that pirating iOS apps has become as easy as it is on Android, where a number of third-party app stores in China carry ripped-off apps. KuaiYong touts itself as supporting even iOS 6 on any device, since no jailbreak is needed. Its own tagline says: “New apps every day, you don’t need to understand mobiles and jailbreaking, don’t need iTunes, don’t need to login – just pick an app, download and install, and use it.”

      KuaiYong was spotted by TheNextWeb today. Digging back through KuaiYong’s official Sina Weibo account (here), it actually launched the first beta of its rogue app back in June 2012. Being only in Chinese seems to have caused it to go under the radar for so long, though there are a few demo videos and written guides out on the web showing everyone how to use KuaiYong on their own iPhones or iPads.

      In deep shit? KuaiYong founder.

      TheNextWeb goes on to point out that KuaiYong is basically using bulk enterprise licensing to bypass Apple’s safeguards. So the Chinese service is essentially distributing the exact same app – with the same license ID – over and over again.

      More trawling through Weibo suggests that the man behind KuaiYong is Xie Lei (pictured right; his Weibo page), who calls himself the CEO of this rather dodgy new Chinese startup. Just a few days ago he posted that KuaiYong now has five million users, and for some reason attached a photo of the top of his shaved head along with that snippet of info. It was posted from his iPhone. We wonder when Mr. Xie will get a call from Apple’s lawyers.

      Report an error

      Tags: Apple, apple in china, apps, China, Chinese apps, copyright, Hackulous, Installous, jailbreak, jailbreaking, Kuaiyong, mobile gamimg, Piracy, 快用

      About Steven Millward

      Steven follows the shininess and brilliance of gadgets, social media and other cultural phenomena across Asia. Specialist areas of research include e-commerce, Android, smartphone adoption, and apps in general. He's currently based near Shanghai. If you have any tips or feedback, contact him via email, or on his Weibo or Twitter.

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      Esperanza Spalding - Radio Song - David Letterman 3-19-12

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      China’s new ‘middle class’ environmental protests

      From Evernote:

      China’s new ‘middle class’ environmental protests

      Clipped from: http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5561-China-s-new-middle-class-environmental-protests?utm_source=Sinocism+Newsletter&utm_campaign=45a833bef7-The_Sinocism_China_Newsletter_For_01_07_2013&utm_medium=email
      This post in the wake of this morning's news that Handan, a city of nine million, had its water supply shut off after the source was contaminated by an upstream factory spill. I recall reading 25 years ago that China was an ecological time bomb on the verge of going off. Clearly, there's been a steady series of explosians over the last two decades.

      While the authorities have devoted considerable resources to confront the problems and improve the quality of life in China's heavily polluted cities, enforcement of clean regualtions are delegated to the local level. There in lies the dilemna. Local officals are paid off to look the other way as industry circumnavigates regulations for the sake of expedience and profit. It takes a "mass incident" like the protests described in the following post to focus the attention of the central government.

      from ChinaDialog http://tinyurl.com/bf5j64n

      China’s new "middle class" environmental protests

      Liu Jianqiang

      02.01.2013

      Most of the large cases of disorder seen in China over the last five years have been sparked by pollution issues. Liu Jianqiang asks why environmental protection has failed.

      Environmental issues are driving China's urban middle-class to the streets in protest (Image by Global Voices)

       

      China’s urban residents (or the new “middle class”) protest on the streets only very rarely. Discontent is expressed almost exclusively online, via angry typing. But this has changed over the last five years – protests have come offline and onto the streets.

      2012 saw popular protests in Ningbo, Shifang and Qidong. There have been widespread demonstrations over the last five years: against a PX plant in Dalian; against waste incinerators almost everywhere; against another PX plant in Xiamen, in the form of a mass “stroll”; against high speed rail in Shanghai, in the form of a mass “shop”; against the Liulitun incinerator in Beijing, when locals picketed the State Environmental Protection Agency. 

      Chinese citizens are taking to the streets again and again, with a new protest arising as soon as the last is resolved.

      And the protests have escalated. Prior to 2012, both officials and the public showed restraint. But in 2012 the people clashed frequently with the government and the police, creating social disorder.

      According to Yang Zhaofei, vice-chair of the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences, the number of environmental protests has increased by an average of 29% every year since 1996, while in 2011 the number of major environmental incidents rose 120%.

      Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher Shan Guangnai told the newspaper Southern Weekend that, “illegal land seizures and relocations, labour disputes and environmental pollution are the three factors driving popular protests."

      Daring to protest

      The harm and fear caused by pollution are the main factors driving unrest in Chinese cities. But the Chinese people have plenty to be angry about: corruption; the rich-poor gap; and more. So why is it only environmental issues which bring them to the streets? 

      There are three reasons: first, pollution is already intolerable, and is a threat to life and health. A vastly richer factory owner living nearby can be accepted, but nobody could tolerate his factory making their children sick. 

      Second, environmental rights are apolitical: protesting does not challenge the authority of the current system. Protestors need not fear being accused of opposing the government. 

      Third, environmental issues have a wider impact than illegal land seizures and labour disputes. A large chemical plant could have an impact on one million people. When tens or hundreds of thousands are in agreement there is safety in numbers.

      Failings of environmental authorities

      But China has long suffered from pollution – why have these clashes only occurred recently? The main reason is the failure of environmental authorities.

      Environmental protection officials and some researchers delight in pointing out that the main causes of these cases of unrest are not actually environmental problems. For example, the proposed smelting plant which sparked protests in Shifang would actually have reduced pollution by replacing smaller and less advanced firms. But the bosses of those smaller firms, unhappy with their lot, encouraged the public to protest. In Ningbo the villagers were unhappy with levels of compensation for relocation, and used the “environmental” banner to bring urban residents out onto the streets.

      There is some truth to these views. Unrest is caused by conflict of interests, and conflicts of interests are not just confined to the environment. Environmental issues may just be a politically safe excuse for protest, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection cannot step in and make up for local government failings.

      But that does not mean the environmental authorities can, as they currently prefer, wash their hands of the matter. Speaking to the media at the recent 18th Party Congress about these cases of unrest, one environmental official said that environmental issues were to be expected, and went on to give four reasons why: 

      “One, construction of projects without approval; two, the need for improvements in the environmental impact assessment process; three, problems with local government capabilities; and four, a lack of legislation and mechanisms for assessing the social impact of major projects.” Only the second of these is anything to do with the environmental authorities.

      But regardless, all of these protests took place under the banner of protecting the environment. If environmental matters were handled properly, there may still be small protests, but not these large incidents.

      There were also other interests involved in the 2007 PX protests in Xiamen, such as property developers and owners encouraging protests on environmental grounds in order to protect property prices. In this respect the 2007 PX protests and the demonstrations of 2012 are identical. But the course of the incidents was completely different. In Xiamen a resolution was reached reasonably peacefully, while in the 2012 things only calmed down after fierce clashes. Why? Because in Xiamen the environmental authorities intervened and prevented outright conflict.

      On the morning of June 7, 2007, as the citizens and government of Xiamen faced off, Pan Yue, deputy director of the State Environmental Protection Agency (later the Ministry of Environmental Protection)  told the media that the agency would immediately carry out a city-wide environmental assessment. He expressed a hope that the Xiamen government would take that assessment into account and make adjustments to its existing plans and, as far as possible, separate the chemical industry and residential areas.

      The effect was immediate, and the project was cancelled before protests became violent.

      Although the environmental authorities do not have much power, they represent the central government stance on environmental matters. When the people and the government clash, local government tends to treat those defending their rights as unruly troublemakers to be supressed. But the environmental authorities, representing central government, cannot be ignored, and so conflict is avoided. The prompt appearance of the environmental authorities also maintains the authority and credibility of central government.

      Lack of progress in past five years

      In subsequent popular protests, and most obviously in the unrest of 2012, the ministry said and did nothing, apart from distancing itself from the incidents after the fact.

      Nor is this the only example of the ministry’s inaction. Over the last five years China’s environment has significantly worsened, yet the ministry has rarely acted. The public right to know and participate are key to resolving disputes and five years ago the ministry issued interim measures on public participation in the environmental impact assessment process and regulations on the release of environmental information, in order to protect these rights. If these were implemented, there would, in theory, be no protests over the environment. But for whatever reason, five years later these rules still exist only on paper.

      Five years ago, SEPA launched crackdown after crackdown on companies breaking the law, even the biggest power firms. It issued regional moratoriums on new projects, preventing local government from issuing new approvals until improvements were made. It halted an illegal project at the Old Summer Palace and held an unprecedented public hearing, providing an example for public participation and democratic decision making. And it started researching regional environmental impact assessments and the idea of a Green GDP (Gross Domestic Product) measurement, designed to halt China’s GDP worship.

      But the last five years have seen no similar actions.

      Even more bizarre, the ministry has relaxed environmental impact assessments, allowing large projects to go ahead easily nationwide, particularly in the ecologically fragile west of China. It is these large projects, carried out with no regard to the environmental or social impact, that are the cause of social unrest.

      China’s environmental authorities are weak, but environmental matters have a huge impact on health and social equality, and now also the chances of unrest. An environmental problem can throw a city into chaos and unsettle the nation. There may even be a possibility of more serious outcomes. China’s new leaders should take a broader view of environmental issues and their environmental authorities.  

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